ABSTRACT Three new trapdoor one-way functions are proposed that are based on elliptic curves over the ring Z n . The rst class of functions is a naive construction, which can be used only in a digital signature scheme, and not in a public-key cryptosystem. The second, preferred class of function, does not su er from this problem and can be used for the same applications as the RSA trapdoor one-way function, including zero-knowledge identi cation protocols. The third class of functions has similar properties to the Rabin trapdoor one-way functions. Although the security of these proposed schemes is based on the di culty of factoring n, like the RSA and Rabin schemes, these schemes seem to be more secure than those schemes from the viewpoint of attacks without factoring such as low multiplier attacks.
Introduction
In their seminal 1976 paper 3], Di e and Hellman introduced the concept of a trapdoor one-way function (TOF). A TOF is a function that is easy to evaluate but infeasible to invert, unless a secret trapdoor is known, in which case the inversion is also easy. Although no realisation of a TOF was proposed in 3], Di e and Hellman observed that such a function would allow the construction of digital signature schemes and public-key cryptosystems, two concepts that they introduced.
The rst implementation of a TOF was proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978 21] . Its security relies on the di culty of factoring a composite number n. Some other implementations 20, 4] of TOFs have been proposed based on the di culty of factoring and discrete logarithms. >From another direction, one of the recent topics in the eld of elliptic curves is their applicability to cryptography. The points of an elliptic curve E over a nite eld form an abelian group. Hence the group E can be used to implement analogs of the Di e-Hellman key exchange scheme and the ElGamal public key cryptosystem, as explained in 9] . The security of these analogous systems rests on the di culty of the discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve.
In this paper, we propose new TOFs (or public-key cryptographic schemes) based on elliptic curves over a ring Z n , although an elliptic curve E over Z n does not form a group.
The security of these TOFs depends on the di culty of factoring n. Although these schemes are less e cient than the RSA and Rabin schemes, our schemes seem to be more secure from the viewpoint of some attacks that do not use factoring such as low multiplier attacks. >From the same reason, even when the RSA system can be broken without factoring the modulus, our schemes seem to remain secure. We begin with a brief review of the basic de nitions and facts about elliptic curves over a nite eld in Section 2. In Section 3, we show some properties of elliptic curves over a ring, which are used in the succeeding sections. Section 4 proposes a naive construction of the TOF (Type 0 scheme) which is based on elliptic curves over a ring, which can be used only in a digital signature scheme, and not in a public-key cryptosystem. In Section 5, we propose the Type 1 scheme which is based on the elliptic curve over a ring, and discuss its properties. In Section 6, we propose the Type 2 scheme based on the elliptic curve over a ring, and discuss its properties. Section 7 discusses the security of the proposed schemes, and Section 8 discusses their performance.
Elliptic Curves over a Finite Field
Let K be a eld of characteristic 6 = 2; 3, and let a; b 2 K be two parameters satisfying together with a special element denoted O and called the point at in nity. We will mainly be interested in elliptic curves over the nite eld F p with p elements, for some prime p. Such a curve will be denoted E p (a; b). What makes elliptic curves interesting in cryptography is the fact that an addition operation on the points of an elliptic curve can be de ned that makes it into an abelian group. This addition operation, which has but its name in common with the ordinary addition of integers, is described in the following.
Let E be an elliptic curve, and let P and Q be two points on E. The point P + Q is de ned according to the following rules. If P = O, then ?P = O, and P + Q = Q (i.e., O is the neutral element of E). Let P = (x 1 ; y 1 ) and Q = (x 2 ; y 2 ). If x 1 = x 2 and y 1 = ?y 2 , then P + Q = O (i.e., the negative of the point (x; y) is the point (x; ?y)). In all other cases the coordinates of P + Q = (x 3 ; y 3 ) are computed as follows. Clearly, the rst equation is equivalent to x 3 = 2 ? 2x 1 when P = Q. All computations are in the eld over which E is de ned. In particular, when the eld is F p , all computations are modulo p. It is straightforward to verify that the de ned addition operation satis es the axioms for a group, i.e., that E is closed under addition and that addition is commutative and associative. (The existence of a neutral element and of inverse elements was mentioned above.)
Let #E p (a; b) denote the order (i.e., the number of points) of the elliptic curve E p (a; b). 
Elliptic Curves over a Ring
We now consider elliptic curves over the ring Z n , where n is an odd composite squarefree integer. (An alternative notation for Z n used in the literature is Z=nZ.) Similar to the de nition of E p (a; b), an elliptic curve E n (a; b) can be de ned as the set of pairs (x; y) 2 Z simply by replacing computations in F p by computations in Z n . However, two problems occur. The rst problem is that because the computation of requires a division which in a ring is de ned only when the divisor is a unit, the addition operation on E n (a; b) is not always de ned. The second problem, which is related to the rst is that E n (a; b) is not a group. It seems therefore impossible to base a cryptographic system on E n (a; b). In the following we present a natural solution to these problems.
For the sake of simplicity, let n = pq in the sequel be the product of only two primes as in the RSA system. Moreover, the addition operation on E n (a; b) described above, whenever it is de ned, is equivalent to the (componentwise de ned) group operation on E p (a; b) E q (a; b). the points at in nity on E p (a; b) and E q (a; b), respectively. By this mapping, all elements of E p (a; b) E q (a; b) are exhausted except the pairs of points P p ; P q ] for which exactly one of the points P p and P q is the point at in nity. Note that the addition operation on E n (a; b) described above is unde ned if and only if the resulting point, when interpreted as an element of E p (a; b) E q (a; b), is one of these special points.
It is important to note that when all prime factors of n are large, it is extremely unlikely that the sum of two points on E n (a; b) is unde ned. In fact, if the probability of the addition operation being unde ned were non-negligible, then the very execution of a computation on E n (a; b) would be a feasible factoring algorithm, which is assumed not to exist. Therefore, the rst problem can be solved by considering the occurence probability.
The second problem, that E n (a; b) is not a group, can be solved by the following lemma. That is, although we cannot use the properties of a nite group directly, we can use a property of E n (a; b) which is similar to that of a nite group. The following lemma can be easily obtained from the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Lemma 3. Let E n (a; b) be an elliptic curve such that gcd(4a 3 + 27b 2 ; n) = 1 and n = pq (p; q: prime). Let N n be lcm(#E p (a; b); #E q (a; b)). Then, for any P 2 E n (a; b), and any integer k, (k N n + 1) P = P:
4 Naive Construction of TOF Based on Elliptic Curves over a Ring
In this section, we show a naive construction of TOFs (Type 0 scheme) which are based on elliptic curves over a ring. These TOFs can be used only in a digital signature scheme, and not in a public-key cryptosystem. The aws of the TOFs of this section are elliminated in the Type 1 and 2 schemes shown in following sections. A digital signature scheme based on E n (a; b) can be set up as follows. The signer Alice chooses two primes p and q (or, more generally, a set of two or more distinct primes) and two parameters a and b satisfying gcd(4a 3 + 27b 2 ; n) = 1, where n = pq. She then computes the orders of the elliptic curves E p (a; b) and E q (a; b) (for example using Schoof's algorithm 22]), chooses a public encryption multiple e relatively prime to both #E p (a; b) and #E q (a; b), and computes the secret decryption multiple d according to d e ?1 (mod lcm(#E p (a; b); #E q (a; b))):
Alice releases as public parameters n; a; b and e. When she later wants to sign a message M she associates a point P = (x; y) 2 E n (a; b) with M in a publicly-known way (see below)
and computes the point Q = (s; t) on E n (a; b) according to Q = (s; t) = d P:
The signature for the message M is the pair (s; t), which can be checked by computing P = (x; y) = e Q on E n (a; b) and extracting the message M from (x; y) (because (ed) P = P from Lemma 3). Here, given a message M, a point (x; y) on E n (a; b) can e ciently be associated with M. M is rst padded with su cient redundancy, for instance by appending zero's to M, resulting in M 0 . x is de ned as the smallest integer greater or equal to M 0 such that x 3 + ax + b is a quadratic residue modulo n, and y is de ned as one of the square roots modulo n of this number.
The aws of this scheme are as follows:
(1) Schoof's algorithm 22] to compute E p (a; b) and E q (a; b) is infeasible for large p. ( 2) The signature is roughly twice as long as the original message M. (3) This scheme cannot be used for a public-key cryptosystem, since knowledge of the trapdoor is required to create a point on E n (a; b), which corresponds to a plaintext.
Basic TOF Based on Elliptic Curves over a Ring
In this section, we propose a new TOF (Type 1 scheme) that is based on elliptic curves over a ring. It overcomes the three aws of the Type 0 scheme. For simplicity, we show a protocol for a public-key cryptosystem in the case of Lemma 1. We can easily construct a public-key cryptosystem in the case of Lemma 2, and digital signature schemes, although we omit a description.
Step 0 (Key Generation) User U chooses large primes p and q such that p q 2 (mod 3):
U computes the product n = pq; and N n = lcm(#E p (0; b); #E q (0; b)) = lcm(p+1; q+1): U chooses an integer e which is coprime to N n , and computes an integer d such that ed 1 (mod N n ):
Summarizing, U's secret key is d; (p; q; #E p (0; b); #E q (0; b); N n ), and U's public key is n; e.
Step 1 (Encryption) A plaintext M = (m x ; m y ) is an integer pair, where m x 2 Z n ; m y 2 Z n . Let M = (m x ; m y ) be a point on the elliptic curve E n (0; b). Sender A encrypts the point M by encryption function E( ) with the receiver's public key e and n as C = E(M) = e M over E n (0; b);
and sends a ciphertext pair C = (c x ; c y ) to a receiver B.
Step 2 (Decryption) Receiver B decrypts a point C by decryption function D( ) with his secret key d and public key n as
Notes]
1. In the case of Lemma 1, the minimum possible value of e is 5 because 2jN n and 3jN n . In the case of Lemma 2, the minimum possible value of e is 3 because 2jN n . 2. For elliptic curves, the addition formula is independent of a and b, and the doubling formula is independent of b. 
We propose another TOF (Type 2 Scheme) also based on elliptic curves over a ring, which is the Rabin-type generalization of the basic TOF (Type 1 scheme). Type 2 scheme also overcomes the three aws of the Type 0 scheme. For simplicity, we also show a protocol for a public-key cryptosystem in the case of Lemma 1.
U computes the product n = pq, and the orders N p = #E p (0; b) = p + 1 and N q = #E q (0; b) = q + 1: Summarizing, U's secret key is p; q; N p ; N q , and U's public key is n.
Step 1 (Encryption) A plaintext M = (m x ; m y ) is an integer pair, where m x 2 Z n ; m y 2 Z n . Let M = (m x ; m y ) be a point on the elliptic curve E n (0; b).
Sender A encrypts the point M by doubling on the elliptic curve E n with the receiver's public key n as C = 2 M over E n (0; b);
Step 2 by using a halving algorithm, which is described in Section 6. Theorem 7. There exists an expected polynomial time algorithm which, given an odd prime p, an elliptic curve E p (a; b) in the case of Lemma 1 or 2, N p , and a point Q 2 DP p as inputs, will output a half point of Q over E p (a; b). The proof of Theorem 7 can be described explicitly in the following algorithm based on the Adleman-Manders-Miller algorithm.
Halving Algorithm on Elliptic Curve for Type 2 scheme
Input: p (prime), E p (a; b), N p , Q (= 2 H) 2 E p (a; b).
Step 1. Compute an odd c, and h such that N p = 2 h c.
Step 2. Choose random point T such that T 2 NDP p and T is in the maximum cyclic subgroup including Q.
Step 3. Set Y = Q, H = (c + 1)=2 Q over E p (a; b).
Step 4. Find the least k such that (2 k c) Y = O over E p (a; b).
Step Step 1. Choose a random point T = (t x ; t y ) on the curve E p (a; 0) such that e n (Q; T) = 1.
Step 2. If T is a non-double point, that is, (p + 1)=4 T 6 = O over E p (a; 0), then output T; else go to step 1. Output: T such that T = (t x ; t y ) 2 NDP p , and T 2 E 0 , where E 0 is a cyclic subgroup of E p (a; 0) with the maximum order of (p + 1)=2 which includes point Q.
There exists a polynomial time general algorithm for nding a point on the elliptic curve 9]. In case 1, for any y 2 Z p , the point ((y 
Security
The security of the proposed Type 1 scheme and Type 2 scheme over elliptic curves is based on the di culty of factoring n. In this section, we discuss the security of these schemes from various viewpoints.
Solving the Order
In the original RSA and Rabin schemes in multiplicative groups, it is known that solving the order (n) = (p ? 1)(q ? 1) is computationally equivalent to factoring n. That is, the former is polynomially reducible to the latter, and vice versa. Similarly, in our proposed schemes (Types 1 and 2 in the cases of Lemmas 1 and 2), we have a similar relationship as follows. Theorem 8. Let N n be lcm(#E p (a; b); #E q (a; b)) = lcm(p + 1; q + 1). Solving N n is computationally equivalent to factoring a composite number n.
Solving the Secret Key
The security of the original RSA scheme is also based on the di culty of solving the secret exponent key. The security of the Type 1 scheme is also based on the di culty of solving the secret multiplier key d. We have the following similar relationship. Theorem 9. Let N n be lcm(#E p (a; b); #E q (a; b)) = lcm(p + 1; q + 1). Solving a secret key d from public keys e and n is computationally equivalent to factoring a composite number n.
Complete Breakage
Completely breaking Type 1 and 2 schemes means to recover both m x and m y from any ciphertext pair (c x ; c y ) and the public keys. It is well known that completely breaking the original Rabin cryptosystem is as hard as factoring the composite n used as the modulus. For the Type 2 scheme, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Completely breaking Type 2 scheme is computationally equivalent to factoring n.
Proof: It is clear that if once the factors of n are known, plaintext (m x ; m y ) can easily be computed from ciphertext (c x ; c y ) and public keys (a; n). Conversely, if there is an Algorithm A1, given P on E n (a; b) (E n (0; b) or E n (a; 0)), to output Q satisfying P = 2 Q with nonnegligible probablity, then we can construct an expected polynomial-time algorithm B to factor n, using A1 as an oracle. First, B chooses a random point R = (r x ; r y ) (r x ; r y 2 Z n ), and multiplies it by 2, asks A1 to halve this point, and B obtains R 0 satisfying P = 2 R 0 with non-negligible probablity. Then B computes R 0 = R ? R 0 . Since 2 R 0 = O, and R 0 over E p (a; b) (R 0 over E q (a; b)) is O p (O q ), then R 0 is an unde ned point with probability 1/2. If R 0 is unde ned, B can compute a non-trivial factor of n by the extended Euclidean algorithm used for the division modulo n. Clearly, the expected running time of B is polynomial-time in log n.
In the Type 1 scheme, the equivalence between completely breaking this scheme and factoring n is not known. This situation is the same as the original RSA scheme.
Homomorphism Attacks and Their Countermeasures
The encryption-decryption functions E( ) and D( ) for Type 1 and 2 schemes are homomor- The probability that randomly chosen integer pairs M 1 and M 2 are on the same elliptic curve is as negligiblly small as 1=n for large number n. Thus, passive attacks using homomorphism seem to be ine ective against Type 1 and 2 schemes.
Consider an active attack (a chosen-plaintext attack) using homomorphism. 
Isomorphism Attacks and Their Countermeasures
The following isomorphic property of the elliptic curves is known. If C 1 ; C 2 and M 1 satisfying congruence (2) are given, then M 2 can be easily found by computing congruence (3) . Notice that it is easy to check whether or not congruence (2) holds. If M 1 and M 2 are randomly chosen, then the probability that there exists u satisfying congruence (2) is a negligibly small 1=n for large n. Thus, passive attacks using isomorphism seem to be di cult for Types 1 and 2 schemes.
Consider an active attack (a chosen-plaintext attack) based on the isomorphic property of the elliptic curves. An attacker may try to forge a signature by using both homomorphism and isomorphism shown above. However, such combined attacks can also be prevented by randomization with the hash function h. 7.6 Security for Low Multiplier Attack Hastad 6] showed a low exponent attack on the original RSA and Rabin schemes when the same message is encrypted with distinct plural moduli. He considered a problem of solving systems of congruences P i (m) 0 (mod n i ) i = 1; :::; k; where P i are polynomial of degree e and the n i are distinct relatively prime numbers and m < min n i . He proved that if k > e(e+1) 2 , then m can be recovered in polynomial time. Thus, he pointed out that enciphering linearly related messages with the RSA scheme with low exponent or the Rabin scheme is insecure. For the original RSA scheme, let c = m e mod n, c i = m e i mod n i , and n = n 1 n 2 n k . In Hastad's algorithm, c is rst obtained from c i using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Next, m is solved from a polynomial c = m e neglecting modulus n. For our proposed Types 1 and 2 schemes, let C = e 0 M over E n (a; b); C i = e 0 M over E n i ; where C = (c x ; c y ); M = (m x ; m y ); C i = (c ix ; c iy ). The value of (c x ; c y ) is also obtained from (c ix ; c iy ). However, it is di cult to solve (m x ; m y ) from (c x ; c y ) because c x and c y are expressed by rational equations in m x and m y . Note that they cannot be expressed by polynomials. Since the rational equations include divisions modulo n, it seems impossible to compute by neglecting modulus n. Thus, even if the multiplier e 0 is small, a Hastad-like attack does not seem to work against the elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Performance
An elliptic curve addition P 1 + P 2 on E n (a; b) requires one division, one squaring operation and one general multiplication in Z n when P 1 6 = P 2 , and an extra squaring when P 1 = P 2 .
(The much faster additions and subtractions in Z n are neglected for the sake of simplicity). Surprisingly, as opposed to Z n where squaring can be performed faster than a general multiplication, doubling a point on an elliptic curve is computationally more costly than adding two di erent points. This means that in order to compute a multiple c P of a point P, an irregular addition chain for c avoiding doubling operations should be used. When neglecting the fact that squaring in Z n can be implemented somewhat faster than a general multiplication, elliptic curve addition and doubling operations require about 2 and 3 multiplications in Z n and one division in Z n , respectively. Division in Z n can be implemented by the generalized Euclidean algorithm for computing greatest common divisors. The most e cient algorithm for computing multiplicative inverses, however, is that invented by Massey 17] , which is a generalization of Stein's algorithm 25]. However, a division in Z n seems to be less e cient than a multiplication in Z n .
On the other hand, if we calculate the addition on E n (a; b) in homogeneous coordinates, we can avoid the division in Z n (except the nal stage of the addition chain), although we must perform more multiplications instead.
Let P 1 = (x 1 ; y 1 ; z 1 ) 2 E p (a; b), P 2 = (x 2 ; y 2 ; z 2 ) 2 E p (a; b), and suppose that P 1 ; P 2 6 = O; P 1 6 = P 2 and P 1 6 = ?P 2 . The addition formula 9] for E p (a; b) to nd P 3 = P 1 + P 2 = Then, one addition and doubling over E n (a; b) require 18 multiplications in Z n , if a = 0.
Therefore, in the a ne coordinates, the computation amount for our scheme (Scheme 1) is about (2 + c) times as much as that for the RSA scheme, where c is the ratio of the computation amount of division in Z n to that of multiplication in Z n . On the other hand, in the homogeneous coordinates, the computation amount for encryption with our scheme is about 18 times as much as that for the RSA scheme. Since in our elliptic curve system a message consists of two elements of Z n compared to only one in the RSA system, the computation speed of our scheme is about 2=(2 + c) or 1=9 of the speed of RSA.
Conclusions
We have proposed new public key cryptosystems based on elliptic curves modulo n, where n is a product of two large primes. Furthermore, we have clari ed the security of these systems. For the proposed Type 1 scheme, the master key concept 10] and the blind signature concept 2] are similarly applicable (using the combined techniques of Sections 7.4 and 7.5).
